The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and fi nance. All papers have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international environment.
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem.
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the Internet at the following website: http://www.bde.es.
Introduction
Asset returns may comove beyond what can be expected from their fundamentals due to the existence of frictions or anomalies. In this paper, we empirically investigate why sovereign
Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads comove 'too' much, or more than what one might expect based on economic similarities between countries. The use of a unique dataset with dealer-level intraday quotes helps us better understand the impact of dealers' activity on CDS comovements. Pairs of sovereign CDS that share common dealers, specifically when those dealers display similar activity over time, tend to be more correlated, all else equal. We measure this common dealership, which we label Commonality in Quotes, as the correlation between the number of daily quotes reported by a given dealer to each of the two countries in a pair.
Our main finding is that the Commonality in Quotes is a powerful driver of CDS abnormal return correlation, controlling for country similarities in default, liquidity, and macro variables. The effect is statistically and economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the Commonality in Quotes would lead to an increase equivalent to 17.3% of the average CDS abnormal return correlation, which we label CDS excess correlation. In fact, the economic impact of the Commonality in Quotes is stronger than that attributable to the remaining country-pair specific and global factors employed as explanatory variables.
We posit that the mechanism causing the CDS excess correlation is the buying pressure faced by CDS dealers. Specifically, we conjecture that the common demand on a given pair of sovereign CDS is explained by the dealers' urgency to buy protection in order to mitigate the credit risk in their portfolios and/or to lower regulatory capital requirements, especially in banks (Yorulmazer, CDS premia in a way that is not necessarily related to the fundamentals of those CDS. As a consequence, when the dealer is active enough, and experiences this buying pressure in the CDS of two different countries, it will induce an extra or non-fundamental correlation between the CDS of those countries. If the mechanism is a fundamental one, through information, then there should be no difference between the strength of the effect associated to dealers facing buying pressure and the others. Thus, the exclusive effect of the former type of dealers is consistent with a non-fundamental friction in the CDS market originated by the dealers. It turns out that the CDS market is especially prone to having relative large players because it is dominated by the so called G14 dealers, who are the largest banks acting as derivatives dealers worldwide and hold roughly 90% of the CDS notional amount (Mengle, 2010) . 1 In fact, we find that our Commonality in Quotes variable explains CDS excess comovement especially when most active dealers face buying pressure.
The relationship between Commonality in Quotes and CDS excess correlation can also move in the opposite direction, so endogeneity could be a concern. For example, dealers could choose to provide more quotes to those pairs of countries whose CDS prices are more correlated. We deal with this issue with an instrumental variable approach. We use as instrument for dealers' buying pressure the average Tier 1 capital ratio of a large group of international banks that are potential participants in the CDS market. The banks employed to obtain the average quarterly Tier 1 for a given pair of countries are those for which the sovereign debt of these countries has positive risk weights. To ensure the potential use of CDS for capital reliefs, we use banks in countries with a positive exposure to the official sectors of both countries forming the pair. Finally, to make the instrument as exogenous as possible, we use banks without headquarters or subsidiaries in any of the two countries forming the pair. The motivation for the use of this instrumental variable relies on the use of CDS by banks as credit risk mitigants to reduce the capital requirements for existing exposures. In the context of the Basel II Accord, banks should satisfy a minimum capital requirement defined as the ratio between core equity (or Tier 1 capital) and risk weighted assets (RWA). Thus, the demand on a given pair of sovereign CDS would be associated with the banks' Tier 1 capital ratio and so, with the participants in the CDS market; but not with Secondly, our findings build on a series of papers related to the broader area of market frictions in financial markets. It is specifically linked to those papers documenting that market frictions make prices deviate from fundamentals or comove beyond fundamentals (see Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) , and others). Our paper also relates to the stream of the literature that investigates the relationship between common dealership and return commonality. In this vein, Pasquariello and Vega (2015) find that cross-price impact is greater among stocks dealt by the same specialist. 2 Although there is a well-established body of studies postulating and providing evidence of excess comovement on stock prices, there is scarce evidence on this phenomenon in the CDS market. 
Data and Methodology

Data and Sample
Intraday CDS quotes disaggregated at the dealer level come from a dataset provided by Credit Market Analysis (CMA hereafter) for 11 EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), spanning from January 2008 to October 2011. The same information is employed for an additional sample of 39 non-EMU countries from January 2010 to October 2011. We primarily focus on the EMU countries for three reasons. First, the level of contagion among these countries during the crisis has been very strong and has persisted for a long period of time. Second, the activity in the EMU sovereign CDS contracts has increased significantly. 5 Third, all of the CDS have similar characteristics in terms of currency, restructuring clauses, and timing. Although most of the action occurs in the European sovereign CDS, we extend our analysis to the whole universe of sovereign CDS contracts to confirm the robustness of our results, showing that the findings are not influenced by the strong credit risk contagion among European countries.
CMA collects its intraday CDS quotes (both executable and indicative) from a robust consortium which consists of around 40 members from the buy-side community (hedge funds, asset managers, and investment banks) who are active participants in the CDS market. 6,7 The quotes collected by CMA are provided by the sell-side (hereafter dealers) to the buy-side investors. As explained in Qiu and Yu (2012) , the process of trading in the CDS market usually begins with clients receiving indicative quotes from dealers through information providers such as Bloomberg. They then initiate a request-for-quote with a single dealer or multiple dealers by phone, email, or through an electronic trading platform. Dealers can respond with competitive binding quotes, which often result in actual transactions. They can also respond with noncompetitive quotes with wide bid-ask spreads or choose not to provide quotes if they do not wish to trade. Each single quote in our sample corresponds to a single dealer whose identity is not observed, but is indicated through a randomized number that is maintained constant for each dealer over the sample period. Every quote offers information on the bid and ask prices and the time in which it is recorded. In fact, the daily data reported by CMA come from these intraday quotes that are aggregated to a daily frequency. Contrary to other CDS data venders, Credit Market Analysis (CMA) DataVision does not categorize its CDS prices along the "composite" or "consensus" lines but uses a strict aggregation methodology to offer daily prices depending on the intraday market activity. The data aggregation is not equally weighted but the different weights are based on the respective age and length of the original sample employed (the last contribution is more influential than the older ones).
5.
According to data provided by DTCC, France, Italy, Germany, and Spain were among the top 5 reference entities in terms of the net notional amount outstanding by September 2011, including sovereign and corporate references. Belgium, Austria and Portugal were in 11th, 12th, and 14th place, respectively. Compared to the remaining sovereign CDS, the net amount outstanding for the 11 EMU countries in our sample ($108 billion) was 1.33 larger than for the rest of the sovereign CDS ($81 billion) by January 2010.
6.
The term buy-side should be viewed from the perspective of securities exchange services that the buy-side uses to trade securities; whereas the sell-side, also called prime brokers, are the sellers of those services. Thus, the buy-side investors in the CDS market can be either protection buyers or sellers. 7. The buy-side community includes major credit-focused houses that receive up to 20,000 e-mail pricing messages a day, covering a wide array of credits; and boutique experts focusing on niche credits. These contributors are spread geographically across Europe and the US. Each of these members contributes their CDS prices to a CMA database which they receive in Bloomberg formatted messages (as well as forms) from their sell-side dealers. Hence, CMA has access to a constant stream and continuously evolving pool of CDS data. The access to OTC communication between buy-side trading desks and their counterparties guarantees that the prices received by CMA from the buy-side community are very likely to be tradable or even executable prices, and that they capture market conditions as they evolve throughout the day. Of course, it is difficult to know precisely whether all of them are tradable or not (Mayordomo, Peña and Schwartz, 2014 Information related to control variables comes from other sources and will be further explained in subsequent subsections. We denote the monthly correlation of daily sovereign filtered CDS returns for countries i and j in month t as 
where and are the total number of quotes given by dealer d to countries i and j at month t, respectively, such that the numerator of equation (2) quotes to Spain, we say that France and Spain only share "1 common quote" from that dealer, the minimum of the two. The denominator is the sum of the numerator to ensure that the sum of across all dealers in each month is equal to one.
This measure, Commonality in Quotes, captures how connected two countries are, depending on the activity, size, and number of dealers handling CDS for those two countries.
We hypothesize that if there is a very active dealer giving many quotes to two countries in a pair, the CDS of those countries will exhibit a high level of comovement. percentiles.
COMMONALITY IN QUOTES AND DEALER'S TRADING PRESSURE
We now turn to a more disaggregated version of the Commonality in Quotes. Consistent with seminal papers on market microstructure (see for instance Ho and Stoll, 1983), we consider that a dealer who is willing to reduce her position in CDS will decrease both the bid and ask prices. On the contrary, a dealer who is willing to buy CDS (and not sell) gives a high bid and ask price to ensure the purchase and deter additional buyers. This willingness towards a joint sale or joint buy of the CDS of a given pair of countries could lead to greater comovement. If that dealer is active enough, the CDS spreads quoted for the two countries would change simultaneously due to the dealer's activity, but not because of the two countries' similarities in fundamentals.
To capture the effect of trading based on buying or selling pressure, we break down the variable Commonality in Quotes in three variables. Commonality in Quotes from Buying Pressure ( is defined as in equation (1), but using quotes from those dealers facing buying pressure. These dealers are willing to buy CDS but less willing to sell protection and so, they are supposed to give high bid and ask quotes relative to other dealers. We consider that a dealer d faces buying pressure on countries i and j when her average bid price and ask price in month t are above the 66 th percentile of the distribution of all dealers' bid and ask prices for both countries. In the same vein, Commonality in Quotes from Selling Pressure ( is defined using quotes from those dealers facing selling pressure on countries i and j. It occurs when her average bid price and ask price are below the 33 rd percentile of those distributions.
14 Finally, we obtain Commonality not from Buying or Selling Pressure ( computed with those dealers that are not in the B or S category.
where l denotes whether dealer d reporting CDS quotes to countries i and j faces buying pressure (B) or selling pressure (S) or none (NBS) in both countries i and j. Thus, we have a commonality variable for each of the three previous possibilities. The notation is similar to the one employed in the baseline commonality variable, but now and are the number of quotes given to country i and country j, respectively, by dealer d with a level of trading pressure l in a given month t. Regarding the weights (ω , they are obtained as in equation (2) but considering separately the dealers in the category of trading pressure l to countries i and j at time t, respectively. denotes the total number of dealers in each of the three categories, denoting the degree of trading pressure l reporting quotes to both countries i and j in month t.
Modeling Sovereign CDS Comovement
The 
14.
We use these percentiles to guarantee a minimum number of observations to compute the correlations. We require that the dealers provide quotes for at least two days to consider their quotes in the computation of the commonality measure. method. The standard errors are double-clustered at the country-pair and month levels. In two different specifications we use the two versions of CQ: the baseline one and the disaggregated one in trading pressure faced by dealers.
Controls
This set of variables accounts for differences and similarities between two countries that may potentially affect the comovements in the CDS spreads. We control for three groups of country-pair specific variables: credit risk of financial institutions, CDS liquidity, and macroeconomic variables. For every pair of countries, we measure the monthly correlation of each of the above variables, computed using daily observations. Given the lower frequency of the macroeconomic variables however, we use the absolute value of their difference to proxy for the similarities in terms of macro fundamentals.
Credit risk of financial institutions: Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) document a significant comovement between bank CDS and sovereign CDS after the announcement of financial sector bailouts in the Eurozone. As a consequence, the stronger the relationship between the financial sectors of two given countries, the more easily the shocks to financial institutions in the first country affect the sovereign sector of the second country. To control for this comovement, we consider the correlation between the log return of the CDS spreads of the banking sectors of the corresponding countries (Corr. Country Banks CDS Log Ret.).
CDS liquidity: Previous literature has documented the existence of a liquidity premium in sovereign CDS prices; thus, the higher the correlation between the liquidity premium of two countries, the larger the correlation in CDS prices would be. To proxy for the effect of liquidity in the comovements, we use the correlation between the sovereign CDS liquidity (Corr. CDS Relative Bid-Ask), proxied by the relative bid-ask spread (i.e., bid-ask spread relative to the mid-spread).
Macro variables: We consider two macro fundamentals in our analysis: government debt and the government net deficit/surplus relative to GDP. Using these variables, we proxy for the stock of debt in countries and the accumulated deficit. They have been found to have significant effects on the sovereign CDS spreads in Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2013) and Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), among others. We use the absolute differences in relative debt (Abs|Debt to GDPi -Debt to GDPj|) and deficits (Abs|Deficit to GDPi -Deficit to GDPj|) to measure the similarities across countries in terms of these two variables.
Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) study the nature of sovereign credit risk based on CDS spreads, and show that the majority of sovereign credit risk can be linked to global factors (a single principal component accounts for 64% of the variation in sovereign credit spreads). In view of this, it is highly plausible that all correlations are driven by a common set of factors besides the pair specific similarities or differences. 16. Given that the regression is performed on a monthly basis, we first compute the monthly average of each variable and then we obtain the percentage change with respect to the previous month. We use the percentage change to be consistent with the definition of the rest of the variables. In addition we repeat the same exercise using the global factors in levels and obtained similar results. Counterparty risk: The higher the counterparty risk, the lower the confidence among institutional investors in the CDS market, and thus, the more difficult it is to find a counterparty to buy or sell protection, the lower the market activity and the higher the correlation risk. As in Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff (2012), we use the dealers' CDS spreads to construct the counterparty risk variable. We follow Arce, Mayordomo, and Peña's (2013) methodology, and proxy counterparty risk in the CDS market through the first principal component obtained from the CDS spreads of the main 14 banks that act as dealers in that market (ΔLog Counterparty).
Risk premium: The risk premium has been found to have a positive effect on credit risk in existing literature (Dieckmann and Plank, 2012). We measure this risk premium by means of the Euro Stoxx 50 index (ΔLog EUROSTOXX50). Results between their CDS excess returns by 0.14%, ceteris paribus. Apart from being statistically significant, the explanatory power of this variable seems to be sizeable, because the R-squared increases 23%: from 8.6% to 10.6% after its inclusion in the regression.
Determinants of Comovements
Regarding the control variables, we observe that, consistent with the existence of a significant liquidity premium in CDS spreads, the stronger the relationship between the liquidity of the CDS contracts for a given pair of countries, the stronger the comovements in their prices. The similarities in the degree of the countries' deficits and indebtedness play a significant role in comovements: if two given countries exhibit a high ratio of deficit relative to GDP or debt to GDP, the market tends to push their CDS in the same direction. The only global variable that exhibits a weakly significant effect on the dependent variable is the Euribor-OIS spread. This supports the evidence documented by Bhansali, Gingrich, and Longstaff Table IV , column (1), and splitting the sample into two sub-periods using this event as the break point: pre-crisis (column (2)), and crisis (column (3)). Independently of the exclusion of Greece and the sample period employed in our analysis, we find that the Commonality in Quotes has a positive and significant effect on the CDS excess comovement.
ROBUSTNESS TESTS AND EXTENSIONS
This section contains a number of robustness tests. The first test concerns the use of alternative frequencies and alternative sample of countries in the regression analysis. The second test deals with the potential bias generated by the lack of trading in a given contract, whereas the third one poses an alternative methodology based on the dealers' characteristics and trading behavior. An additional battery of robustness tests is reported in the Internet Appendix.
a. Alternative Frequencies and Alternative Sample of Countries
We next show that the effect of the commonality does not depend on the data frequency employed. To that end, we use an alternative time frame in our analysis to build on the results obtained with monthly frequency. Thus, we perform a regression analysis in which the variables are defined at weekly frequency. For instance, the Commonality in Quotes is obtained as in equation (1) but by computing weekly correlations from the number of quotes per day. The same procedure is applied to the rest of correlation variables and for the global variables we take the weekly average. 17 Regarding the remaining independent variables, the absolute differences for a given pair of countries in the ratios of debt and deficit to GDP are those used in Table III and have a quarterly frequency. As shown in column (1) of Table V, independently on whether we perform the regressions on a monthly or weekly basis, the variable of interest still plays a significant role on the CDS comovements.
To analyze whether the results in our paper are short-lived or not, we test whether the commonalities in quotes are powerful predictors of CDS comovements one week ahead. For that aim, we estimate a variation of equation (4) in which all explanatory variables are lagged one week. The results are reported in column (2) of Table V . We observe that the coefficient associated to the Commonality in Quotes is not statistically different from zero suggesting that this effect is contemporaneous or short-lived. This result is consistent with the signature prediction of asset markets with frictions, stating that frictions tend to disappear and align more closely with fundamentals.
Finally, to ensure that the results are not due to the strong similarities among the 11 EMU countries forming the sample, we next extend our analysis to the entire universe of sovereign CDS for which there are regular quotes. This leads to a final sample that consists of 50 countries (39 non-EMU countries) for the sample period 2010-2011. Column (4) of Table V contains the results obtained for the baseline specification extended to all countries. 18 We still find a positive and strongly significant effect of commonalities.
b. Dealing with the lack of trading
The dealer commonality measure could be biased towards the excess commonality by counting in non-tradable quotes. This upward bias could affect ultimately the effect of the commonality in quotes on the CDS comovements. For this reason we perform several robustness tests, to deal with the potential biases caused by non-traded contracts.
We first remove from the sample the most inactively traded countries. We cannot differentiate the tradable and non-tradable quotes in our dataset. However, we exploit the information in DTCC that contains the number of contracts traded in a given week. We
17.
Instead of using weekly averages in a given week we use the last observation available one week before and obtain similar results. 18. Due to the lack of information on the banking sector CDS spreads of many non-EMU countries, we substitute the credit risk of the financial institution control variable by the absolute difference of bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans defined on an annual basis (Abs|NPLTLi -NPLTLj|).
consider as actively traded contracts those ones traded every week in a given month and as inactively traded contracts those in which there is not trading in at least one week of the month.
The results reported in column (1) of Table VI In this subsection we conduct a complementary analysis that provides additional evidence on the return comovements due to common dealers. We consider that a given pair of CDS has a common dealer if the specialist in both countries is the same. To define a dealer as a specialist in a given CDS contract, we consider a variation of the term specialist in Coughenour and Saad (2004) . Their analysis relies on the NYSE specialist system according to which specialists are those traders that specialize in a particular stock by maintaining a fixed position at a post on the NYSE floor and execute orders for other brokers.
19.
We have used other percentile 25th / 75th, and the median to split the contracts as actively and non-actively traded, and both obtain similar results.
Our data corresponds to an OTC market for which there is not a formal definition of specialist, and thus we propose a method to classify market makers as specialists depending on their quoting activity. To that aim, we use the whole universe of sovereign CDS. It guarantees the existence of a higher number of CDS contracts that are traded by different dealers, such that each country or group of countries has different specialists. Although our dataset consists of quotes, we get information from DTCC on the number of contracts traded in a given week. This information enables us to assign the best bid and ask quotes to potential purchases and sales of CDS. As a first attempt, to construct the inventory for each dealer we order the bid and ask prices obtained from the dealers in a type of limit order book, in which we assume that the highest (lowest) bid (ask) prices within a given week are the most likely ones to end up in trades. This strategy enables us to "infer" the number of contracts traded by each dealer each week and to aggregate them at the monthly level, which allows us to classify them as specialists in a given country. We consider three alternative methods to classify specialist dealers: a) A dealer whose average number of monthly trades, independently on whether they are purchases or sales, is the highest across all dealers.
b) A dealer with the highest number of accumulated trades independently on whether they are purchases or sales.
c) A dealer that has been the most active trader in the highest number of weeks.
One could argue that the price variation within a given week could be so high that the creation of the limit order book on a weekly basis is not adequate. For that reason, we define the limit order book at a daily level, and assume that the best bid and ask prices in a given day are the ones that are more likely to be tradable. To that end, we divide the number of trades in a given week by the number of banking days in that week to determine the dealers that are zero for all the specialist definitions, and confirm that the dealer commonality has a strong explanatory power beyond market factors. In sum, this analysis provides further evidence in favor of the existence of comovement in CDS prices derived from the dealers that actively give quotes to a given pair or group of countries.
Comovements and Dealers' Trading Pressure
In us disentangle the origin of the effect. If the mechanism is a fundamental one, through information, then there should be no difference between the strength of the effect of the three different disaggregated variables. If, however, we find stronger effect from buying or selling pressure variables than the non-buying or selling (as we do), then it is consistent with a friction that is non-fundamental. As detailed in Section II.B, we consider common high (low) ask and bid prices for a given pair of countries to define dealers facing buying (selling) pressure. The commonalities obtained from dealers facing buying (selling) pressure for a given pair of countries are denoted as ( while the ones obtained from dealers who do not face trading pressure are denoted as . The results obtained for the joint use of the three types of commonalities are reported in column (1) of Table VIII . We observe that the effect of commonalities obtained from dealers facing buying pressure is significantly different from zero, while that for dealers facing selling pressure and those who do not face either buying or selling pressure is not. 21 The coefficients of the remaining control variables remain unchanged. It suggests that dealers willing to increase their positions in a given pair of EMU countries contribute to increasing the CDS prices of those countries and, consequently, their correlation.
This supports Shachar's (2013) finding that the contemporaneous price impact of buying is much larger than the immediate price impact of selling. Moreover, the role of dealers buying 20. The correlation coefficient is not far away from the average correlation coefficient between the change in market portfolio spreads and specialist portfolio spreads obtained by Coughenour and Saad (2004), which is roughly 0.70. The adjusted R-squared in the multivariate regression is higher than the ones obtained for the regressions with a single factor (either the market or the dealer factors) which confirms that near-multicollinearity should not influence the precision of the coefficient estimates (see Greene, 1990 , p. 280).
21.
A given dealer d is considered as facing buying (selling) pressure for countries i and j when her average bid and ask prices are above (below) the 66th (33rd) percentile in both countries. The use of the 25th and 75th percentiles delivers similar results but leads to a lower number of observations to implement the analysis.
pressure on CDS prices and comovements is supported by the increase in the real demand of dealers in the sovereign CDS market that exhibit an increasing trend since mid-2009 (see Klingler and Lando, 2014 There are additional frictions and features of the sovereign CDS market that could help explain the role of common quotes from dealers facing buying pressure. According to market microstructure literature, common demand of a pair of sovereign CDS may be the result of managing inventory risk on single securities traded by a dealer facing that risk (Shachar, 2013;  and Gehde-Trapp, Gündüz, and Nasev, 2015). 24 The buying pressure could also obey to the dealers' willingness to express their opinion or information on the country creditworthiness using naked CDS positions (Duffie, 2010).
Most of the quotes are reported by a small number of dealers (see Section II. A) and so, the commonalities in quotes associated to these dealers could have a stronger effect on the excess correlations. In fact, Mengle (2010) documents that the 14 largest dealers worldwide hold roughly 90% of the CDS notional amount. To deal with this issue we define a more disaggregated version of the commonalities in quotes variables for dealers facing buying pressure. To capture the effect of dealers' market power, we break down the variable Commonality in Quotes from Buying Pressure ( ) in two variables according to the dealer's activity. We define active dealers facing buying pressure in a given month t as those whose total number of quotes to a given pair of countries is above the median ( ) of the distribution of the total number of quotes per pair and dealer. Given that dealers contributing a high number of quotes are expected to trade more, it seems reasonable to refer to the active dealers as large dealers. Column (2) of consistent with the "notion that the lack of competition in CDS markets gives rise to dealer market power with significant price impact". Table VIII and support the significant role played by the dealers facing buying pressure on CDS excess correlations.
Accounting for Endogeneity
In our analysis, we have regressed monthly CDS excess comovements on dealers' quote commonalities. Nevertheless, endogeneity may be a concern here because it is plausible that innovations in CDS excess comovements may simultaneously affect the dealers' common quotes through some behavior observed in such correlations. To conclude that the Commonality in Quotes is indeed causing an increase in CDS excess comovements, we reestimate the regressions reported in equation (4) using two different methods: an instrumental variable approach, and an analysis using the commonalities in quotes filtered from the three lags of CDS return correlations. In addition to dealing with endogeneity, the instrumental variable approach also strengthens our hypothesis of this effect coming from a nonfundamental friction. Indeed, if it was a different channel (different from the use of CDS as capital relief purposes), then we would not necessarily see a correlation of our instrument with our Commonality in Quotes variable, as we will see in the next few paragraphs.
We first consider the use of instrumental variables. We require an instrumental variable that exclusively affects the participants in the CDS market, not the entire economy. The channel through which we explain the effect of Commonality in Quotes on CDS excess correlation is the demand pressure of sovereign CDS to mitigate credit risk exposures for capital relief purposes. In the context of the Basel II Accord, banks should satisfy a minimum capital requirement defined as the ratio between core equity (or Tier 1 capital) and risk weighted assets (RWA). In the RWA calculation under the Standardised Approach, claims on sovereign debt are risk weighted depending on the rating of the issuer country: 0% (AAA to AA-), 20%
(A+ to A-), 50% (BBB+ to BBB-), 100% (BB+ to B-or unrated), 150% (below B-). 25, 26 In view of this, we use as an instrument for each pair of countries the average quarterly Tier 1 capital ratio of a subset of internationally active banking institutions.
25. http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1312v.htm 26. IRB risk weights for sovereign assets are even higher. For instance, the illustrative example provided in the previous link to the treatment of sovereign risk in the Basel capital framework assigns a weight of 7.53% to a sovereign asset with a probability of default of 0.01%, a loss given default of 45%, and a maturity of 2.5 year.
The banks employed to obtain the average quarterly Tier 1 for a given pair of countries are those for which the sovereign debt of these countries has positive risk weights. These banks are selected as follows. First, we require that banks' headquarters are not located in any of the two countries/economic areas forming the pair. 27 Second, we require that the domestic banks of a given country exhibit a positive exposure to the official sector of both countries forming the pair. 28 There 27. Basel II Accord recognizes the national discretion of lowering the risk weight applied to their banks' exposures denominated in domestic currency and, in fact, it is often in practice zero. For this reason, in the case of EMU countries, we do not consider banks belonging to any of the EMU countries. 28. The "official sector" comprises the general government sector, central bank sector and international organizations (including multilateral development banks). 29. The use of CDS by banks to improve the appearance of their capital ratios could also have adverse effects. For instance, it could lead to an incentive to invest in highly risky projects (Yorulmazer, 2013) , and, as a consequence, to increase systemic risk. The instrumental variable regression is based on equation (4) in which the Commonality in Quotes from Buying Pressure ( ) is instrumented through the abovementioned instrument. The regression is performed on a subset of pairs of countries from the whole universe of sovereign CDS described in Section II.A and summarized in Panel B of Table I . The analysis is conducted on those non-OECD countries with a rating category equal or lower than A+ at any quarter over the sample period. These are pairs of countries whose long-term bonds have a positive risk weight that could favor the demand of sovereign CDS to reduce the capital requirements. The sample consists of 15 countries. 31 Due to the use of non-EMU countries, the analysis relies on quarterly observations for the period 2010-2011.
Column (1) of Table IX reports the results for the instrumental variable analysis conducted on those pairs of countries. The results of the first stage in which we regress on the instrument are reported at the end of Table IX ), we conclude that the potential endogeneity of these commonalities does not bias our results. 32 This piece of evidence confirms that our finding does indeed come from a causal relationship between Commonality in Quotes and CDS excess return comovement.
To verify the validity of our instrument, we perform the Kleibergen-Paap Rank LM statistic to check whether the equation is identified, that is, whether the excluded instrument (the average Tier 1 capital ratio for the corresponding subset of banks) is "relevant" (correlated with the endogenous regressor). According to this under-identification test, we reject the null hypothesis (equation is under-identified); thus, the instrument is relevant and the model is identified. 33 As the previous instrumental regression is exactly identified, we consider the squared of the average Tier 1 capital ratio as an additional instrument to formally test the exogeneity of the instrument through the Hansen J statistic. Under the null hypothesis, all instruments are uncorrelated with the residual terms and thus, exclusion restriction is satisfied.
According to the results available in column (2) of Table IX , we cannot reject the null hypothesis. As a consequence, we do not find evidence in favor of the violation of the exclusion restriction, and thus confirm the validity of the instrument.
It is not likely that the comovement in a given pair of CDS may affect significantly the average capital ratio of the sample of international banks used to define the instrument. These international banks are selected such that they do not have headquarters and subsidiaries in any of the two countries in the pair. In fact, the test for the exclusion seems to confirm that statement.
However, to further confirm that our results are not affected by endogeneity, we perform a new instrumental approach in which use the average Tier 1 calculated for each pair of countries 31. The countries forming the sample are the following: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Ukraine. 32. We perform a regression analysis to estimate the coefficients of equation (4) at monthly and quarterly frequencies based on the sample used to perform this IV analysis and find that the variable Commonalities in Quotes exhibits a positive and significant coefficient for both specifications. 33. We also perform a weak identification test to analyze whether the instrument is weakly correlated with the common quotes. In view of the Kleibergen-Paap Wald Rank F statistic, we reject the hypotheses that the equation is weakly identified.
lagged one quarter. It is not reasonable that the comovements of CDS in a given quarter affect the aggregate bank capital ratio in the previous quarter because the dealers' quoting/trading activity takes place after the reporting of the capital ratio. The results obtained for the lagged instrument are reported in column (3) of Table IX and support the existence of a causal effect.
We perform an additional robustness check to rule out how banks' CDS quoting activity is correlated with CDS spreads. Thus, to show that the potential correlation between two CDS contracts and banks' balance sheet is not an issue, we filter even more our sample such that we restrict our IV analysis to a sample of countries with an average Fisher's transformed correlation that is between -0.35 and 0.35 such that it is not statistically different from zero. As shown in column (4) of Table IX , the instrumented variable exhibit a positive and significant coefficient consistent with the ones obtained in the two previous analysis of endogeneity, and supports the validity of our results.
Finally, we perform an additional analysis to ensure that our results do not suffer from endogeneity. According to Andrade, Chang, and Seasholes (2008), the cross-security price pressure that may lead to excess comovements across securities is higher among securities with more correlated fundamentals, for example, cash flows in the case of stocks. In addition to the instrumental variable analysis above, we now present an analysis that consists of two stages. In the first stage, we regress the Commonality in Quotes from Buying Pressure ( ) on three lags of the CDS return correlation and use the residuals as our variable of interest.
Filtering the commonalities in this way ensures that the past effects of CDS correlations will not be an issue in our analysis. We implement it on the EMU countries employed in the baseline analysis, and the results are reported in column (5) of Table IX . These results strongly support the consistency of the results obtained in previous analyses. Although we have tried to defend the causal relation through several specifications and econometric strategies, it is important to acknowledge that they could present some shortcomings and limitations, given that there could be other alternative mechanisms in play behind the results that we cannot rule out.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect of the CDS market dealers' activity on the comovement of sovereign CDS spreads. The lack of information on intraday quotes at the dealer level leaves a gap in the literature documenting the role of dealers' activity in CDS contacts. The use of a dataset that consists of the intraday quotes contributed by each specific dealer enables us to fill this gap and provide new evidence about the role of non-fundamental factors in explaining such comovements in periods in which market frictions emerge in the CDS market.
We show that a simple measure of the connectedness of two sovereign CDS through their common dealers' quoting activity is a powerful driver of the variation in CDS excess return correlations. In fact, the economic impact of the commonality variable is much stronger than the impact attributable to other country-pair fundamentals such as credit, default, and liquidity risks and macro factors.
The strong effect of this Commonality in Quotes is explained by the strategy adopted by dealers to trade. If dealers face buying pressure in two countries at the same time, the joint purchases of CDS for those countries would lead to simultaneous changes in the prices of the two CDS. An instrumental variable analysis confirms that our findings indeed reflect a causal relationship between Commonality in Quotes and CDS excess comovement.
These results are consistent with the CDS premia containing a non-default-related component that strongly contributes to causing comovement across credit spreads. Thus, the economic magnitude of this non-fundamental based trading should be accounted for before extrapolating measures of contagion or comovement from CDS prices. This would improve the usefulness of CDS to monitor credit risk and contagion across countries. In addition, securities markets regulators should be aware of this finding, and make decisions accordingly to lessen the effect of non-fundamental price pressures on financial instruments traded in markets with few and large dealers.
Finally, the new evidence on the determinants of comovement among sovereign CDS spreads has important implications for the risk diversification of the euro zone debt portfolios;
given that investors should understand that an important part of the comovement in their portfolios is not due to fundamentals but to commonalities in dealers' quotes. Comovements in Sovereign CDS .6
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Commonalities in Quotes to the number of quotes given by dealers to both countries in the pair, and a set of controls, all of them in t. The
Fisher transformation is also applied to and to the rest of controls that are correlation coefficients. Dep. reports the panel estimates of a regression analysis in which the variables are defined at weekly frequency.
Commonality in Quotes
For instance, the Commonality in Quotes is obtained as in equation (1), but in this case we compute weekly correlations (Fisher transformation applied) from the number of quotes per day. The same procedure is applied to the rest of correlation variables, and for the global variables we take the weekly average. For the remaining independent variables, the absolute differences in the ratios of debt and deficit to GDP for a given pair of countries are those used in Table III (Table III) , apart from the correlation of country banks' CDS log returns, which, due to the lack of information, is substituted by the absolute difference of bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans, defined on an annual basis. Standard errors in brackets are double-clustered at the country-pair and day level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dep. (5) are obtained using the whole universe of sovereign CDS for a time period that spans from January 2010 to October 2011, due to the availability of data for the non-EMU countries. The results reported in columns (1) and (3) are obtained using all the contracts and months for which there is information in DTCC. In columns (2) and (4) we remove from the sample the most inactively traded countries. We consider as actively traded contracts those ones traded every week in a given month, according to the information in DTCC, and as inactively traded contracts those in which there is not trading in at least one week of the month. Finally, in columns (5) and (6) we propose a new classification to define actively and non-actively traded countries. Specifically, we compute for each month the 33th and 66th percentiles from the distribution of the number of contracts traded on the sample of countries. We then define a contract as non-actively traded if the number of traded contracts in that country in that month is below the 33th percentile, whereas actively traded contracts are those that are above the 66th percentile. Column (5) corresponds to the analysis of pairs formed by non-actively traded countries, and column (6) corresponds to pairs formed by a country that is actively traded and another one that is not. The Fisher transformation is applied to all the variables that are correlation coefficients (i.e., the dependent variable, the variable of interest, and several controls This table provides additional evidence on the comovements in returns due to common dealers based on the sample of 50 countries for the period January 2010-October 2011. We consider that a given pair of CDS has a common dealer if the specialist in both countries is the same. We classify market makers as specialists depending on their quoting activity. We use information on the number of contracts traded in a given week from DTCC, and assign the best bid and ask quotes to potential purchases and sales of CDS.
We first define the purchases and sales for each dealer by ordering their bid and ask prices in a type of limit order book, assuming that the highest (lowest) bid (ask) prices within a given week are the most likely to end up in trades. This strategy enables us to "infer" the number of contracts traded by each dealer each week, and to add them at monthly level so that we can classify them as specialists in a given country. We also order the best bid and ask prices at daily level and assume that the best bid and ask prices in a given day are the ones that are more likely to be tradable. To obtain the number of daily trades, we divide the number of trades in a given week by the number of banking days in that week. The daily trades of a dealer are then aggregated at the monthly level to classify them as specialist, depending on their trading activity in each country. We consider three alternative methods to classify dealers as specialists: (i) those whose average number of monthly trades, independently on whether they are purchases or sales, is the highest across all dealers; (ii) those with the highest number of accumulated trades independently on whether they are purchases or sales; (iii) those that have been the most active traders in the highest number of weeks.
To obtain the role of common dealership on CDS comovements we propose an extended market model in which the dependent variable is the CDS return, which is regressed on a market factor and a dealer/specialist factor (see equation # for further details). Each column reports the average estimate for each of the two factors joint, with the t-statistic associated to each test (to see if the average estimate for each factor is statistically different from zero). Columns (1), (2), and (3) contain the results obtained for the definitions of specialist (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively, for the case in which the trades are assigned on a weekly basis. Columns (4), (5), and (6) contain the results obtained for the definitions of specialist (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively, for the case in which the trades are assigned on a daily basis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. facing buying pressure in a given month as those whose total number of quotes to a given pair of countries is above the median (CQ )of the distribution of the total number of quotes per pair and dealer.
Column (2) contains the results obtained from the joint use of the four types of commonalities. Additionally, we require that the domestic banks of a given country exhibit a positive exposure to the official sector of both countries forming the pair, and exclude banks with subsidiaries in any of the two countries in the pair. The analysis is performed on a subset of pairs of non-OECD countries with rating category equal or lower than A+ (positive risk weight) from the whole universe of sovereign CDS described in Panel B of Table I .
Information of the Tier 1 capital ratio is released on a quarterly basis, so the analysis relies on quarterly observations for the period 2010-2011 (and hence the dependent and control variables are the ones in Table   III , but on a quarterly basis). Column (1) reports the results for the instrumental variable analysis. In column (2) we check whether the instrument in column (1) is uncorrelated with the error term. To that aim, we propose an equation that is not exactly identified, by including the squared of the instrument as an additional instrumental variable. In column (3) we perform a new instrumental approach in which we use the average Tier 1 calculated for each of pair countries lagged one quarter. In column (4) we filter even more our sample in such a way that we restrict the IV analysis performed in column (2) to a sample of countries with an average CDS excess correlation that is not statistically different from zero. Column (5) reports the results obtained from an alternative methodology to deal with endogeneity. This column contains the estimates of panel regressions on the monthly correlation of daily sovereign filtered CDS returns for the sample of 11 EMU countries listed in 
